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A L V I N  1. G O L D M A N  
P E R C E P T U A L  O B J E C T S *  
What are the conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
person, or organism, to perceive a given object? More precisely, what is 
the nature of our ordinary thought about perception that gives rise to our 
willingness or unwillingness to say that S perceives O? Some form of 
causal theory of perception is now, I think, widely accepted. Such a theory 
maintains that it is part of our concept of perception that S perceives O 
only if O causes a percept, or perceptual state, of S. I accept this causal 
requirement, though with some qualification. The crucial problem for the 
theory of perception is what must be added to the causal requirement. 
Not all causes of a percept are said to be perceived. Smith looks at a tree 
illuminated by the sun, when the sun is not itself in view. His visual 
percept is caused by the tree, but not only the tree. The percept's causal 
ancestry includes the sun and the array of light two inches from Smith's 
eyes. Why do we say that he sees the tree, but not the sun or the array of 
light? What principles underlie this invidious choice among causes? 
Similarly, we think of a bat as perceiving objects in his path, but not as 
perceiving himself. Yet, since he emits the sonar signals these objects 
reflect, he is himself a cause of his percepts. Why don't  we say he 
perceives himself? 
My proposed solution focuses indirectly on the information acquired 
through perception. The primary function of perception is the generation 
of information, or true belief, about the organism's environment. Organ- 
isms deploy their sensory apparatus in ways designed to acquire such 
information. They focus their eyes toward an object they want to know 
about; they move their hands, paws, or claws over objects that interest 
them; they sniff the air, perk up their ears, and extend their antennae 
when curiosity provokes them. 
A straightforward information-acquisition theory of perception will 
not do, however. How would such a theory be formulated? Here is a first 
Synthese 35 (1977) 257-284. All Rights Reserved 
Copyright © 1977 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 
258 A L V I N  I. G O L D M A N  
try. S perceives 0 if and only if 0 causes a percept of S which gives rise to, or 
generates, at least one true belief about O. ~ One difficulty is that this does 
not provide a necessary condition for perception; or so it seems. There 
are, or seem to be, cases in which no true belief is formed about a 
perceptual object. In one kind of apparent counterexample, no belief at 
all is formed about the perceptual object. In Pitcher's desert traveller case 
(Pitcher, 1971), a man travelling in the desert sees a distant oasis, but, 
having been fooled before, thinks he is just hallucinating. Although he 
doesn't  believe there is a pool of water, or anything like that, ahead of 
him, he does see the oasis. This example is not conclusive. Pitcher would 
reply that the man forms at least a suppressed belief (or suppressed 
inclination to believe) that water is ahead of him. If we construe 'belief' 
broadly, the case may not be a counterexample. Perhaps other cases, 
however, would show that the analysis is too strong. They may be cases in 
which some belief about O is generated, but no true belief. Seeing an 
object in a house of distorting mirrors, you may mistake its location, 
shape, color, and all other properties. Hearing a muffled sound, and 
misjudging its direction, you may form no true belief about its source. 
Glimpsing an object briefly, with a misleading mental set, your percep- 
tion of it may be wholly false. 
I shall not try to show conclusively that true belief formation isn't 
necessary for perception. Even if it is necessary, it isn't sufficient; so the 
analysis is still in trouble. In the tree-sun case, Smith may well form true 
beliefs (indeed, 'non-inferential '  beliefs) about the sun. By looking at the 
tree, he may detect the approximate position of the sun in the sky. Since 
the sun is one of his percept's causes, the analysis mistakenly implies that 
Smith perceives the sun. 
To avert this difficulty, the information-acquisition approach could be 
revised as follows. S perceives 0 if and only if 0 causes some percept of S 
which generates more true beliefs about 0 than about any other cause of the 
percept. The rationale for the revision is, of course, that although Smith 
may form one or two true beliefs about the sun, he will surely form more 
true beliefs about the tree. But is this necessarily so? If the tree is at some 
distance, and Smith is almost blinded by the light, he may discern very 
little about the tree and acquire more information about the sun. 
An instructive example for examining the proposed analysis is a slightly 
elaborated version of Grice's two-pillar case (Grice, 1961). Jones is 
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looking in the direction of pillar P, but his view of P is blocked by a mirror 
(of which he is unaware). The mirror reflects the image of pillar P*, 
qualitatively identical to P but off to the side. Things look to Jones just as 
they would look if the mirror were not there. As a result of his visual 
experience Jones acquires a belief, or set of beliefs, that there is a pillar of 
roughly such-and-such a height, such-and-such a shape, and such-and- 
such a color directly ahead of him. Suppose further that P's presence is a 
cause of P*'s presence. (A mechanical contraption ensures that P* comes 
out of the ground into its-current position if and only if P moves into its 
current position). Hence, by the transitivity of causation, P is a cause of 
Jones' percept: P's presence causes P*'s presence, and P* (via the mirror 
reflection) causes Jones' percept. 
Which pillar does Jones perceive? The correct answer is P*; but does 
the proposed analysis yield that answer? More of the descriptive content 
of Jones' beliefs is satisfied by P than by P*. Not only does P, like P*, have 
the right height, shape, color, and distance, but also, unlike P*, 
it is directly ahead of Jones. So it looks as if Jones forms more true 
beliefs about P than about P*, and this incorrectly implies that Jones 
perceives P. 
A way out of the counterexample is to reply that Jones' beliefs aren't 
aboutP; they are about P*. That is why the analysis survives the putative 
counterexample. This reply won't do. We need an account of the condi- 
tions in which a belief, or set of beliefs, is about a given object, if we are 
going to be able to apply the proposed analysis. In other words, we need 
an account of de re belief. But an account of de re belief, I suspect, 
presupposes an analysis of perceptual objects. The reason we say that 
Jones' beliefs are abo[a P*, for example, is that P* is the perceptual 
object of Jones' visual percept. The notion of perceptual objects, then, is 
conceptually prior to the notion of de re belief; so it is illegitimate to use 
de re belief in an analysis of perceptual objecthood. 
To avoid the de re construction, the analysis might be revised once 
more. Suppose that percepts give rise to (or are constituted by) sets of (de 
dicto) beliefs in existential propositions, the matrices, or open sentences, 
of which can be satisfied by one or more objects. The analysis, then, may 
be rewritten as follows. S perceives 0 if and only if 0 causes a percept of S 
which generates existential beliefs whose matrices are satisfied more by 0 
.than by any other cause of the percept. The defectiveness of this analysis is 
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evident. In the two-pillar case P satisfies more of the relevant matrices 
than P* does. But S sees P*, not P. 
I conclude that a direct information-acquisition approach to perceptual 
objects is misguided. 1 propose a more complicated approach, in which 
true belief plays an important but indirect role. 
1I 
Perception is always perception in a modality. We neverjust perceive; we 
either see, or hear, or smell, etc. A theory of perceptual objects must 
therefore be a theory of our perceptual modality concepts. The heart of 
my theory is briefly encapsulated in the following rational reconstruction 
of such concepts. 
Suppose someone S (or some organisml or group of organisms) has 
percepts of kind Q, where Q is defined by 'qualitative' similarity. These 
percepts characteristically, generate beliefs concerning objects in the 
environment, and frequently the percept-generated beliefs are uniquely 
satisfied by an environmental object. For example, a given Q-percept of S 
generates a belief that there is currently an object at location L with 
properties F, G, and H;  and there is precisely one object at L having F, G, 
and H. Now we consider all such cases with which we are acquainted. We 
notice that in the great majority of these cases the objects uniquely 
satisfying the Q-generated beliefs bear a certain relation to the perceiver, 
or to his pe~-cept, at the time he has the percept. Since this relation seems 
to play a special role in producing true Q-generated beliefs, we select this 
relation as constitutive of a modality concept. We introduce a modality 
term 'M',  and we say that all and only objects bearing this relation to a 
Q-perceiver, or to his Q-percept, are M-perceived by him. All and only 
objects in this relation are M-perceptual objects, or M-objects, of the 
Q-perceiver. Objects not in this relation are not M-objects, even if they 
are causally relevant to a Q-percept and even if they satisfy (or uniquely 
satisfy) a Q-generated belief. The nature of the selected relation will be 
discussed below. (Actually, it will turn out that a family of three relations 
is involved: environmental, counterfactual, and causal. For simplicity, 
though, this sketch talks of a single relation.) What should be emphasized 
here is this. The rationale for choosing a given relation as constitutive of a 
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perceptual modality is its ge,~eral (though not necessarily universal) 
correlation with unique belief-satisfaction. But since it is logically pos- 
sible for this relation to hold between an object, O, and a perceiver, S, 
even when S forms no Q-generated belief which O satisfies (uniquely or 
otherwise), it is logically possible for S to M-perceive O without forming 
any beliefs which O satisfies. 
Now in certain cases a Q-percept may generate two (or more) beliefs 
each of which is uniquely satisfied by a different object, where these 
objects are in different relations to the percept. A single visual percept, 
for example, may generate a belief that a certain tree uniquely satisfies 
and another belief that the sun uniquely satisfies, though the tree and the 
sun, on this occasion, bear significantly different relations to the percept 
(or to the perceiver). How do we decide, then, which relation is to be 
constitutive of the Q-percept modality? We focus on Q-percepts in 
general, not on any specific case. If Q-generated beliefs are satisfied (or 
uniquely satisfied) far more frequently by objects in one relation than by 
objects in any other relation, this relation is selected as the sole con- 
stJituent of the M-modality. If Q-generated beliefs are satisfied very 
frequently by objects in each of two (or more) relations - say, in roughly 
comparable amounts - then both relations are constituents of the M- 
modality. Thus, an object in either of these relations is said to be 
M-perceived. 
Let me illustrate and elaborate the foregoing model by reference to 
vision. Consider the beliefs that are typically generated by visual per- 
cepts. When these beliefs are uniquely satisfied by particular objects, 
which objects are they? That is, what is the relation of these objects, at the 
time in question, to the subject of the Q-percept (the perceiver)? In the 
vast majority of cases, the environmental relation between each object 
and the perceiver can be characterized roughly as follows. Consider the 
conical region that extends indefinitely outwards from the perceiver's 
(open) eyes, in the direction of ocular fixation. (The sides of the cone are 
the boundaries of his peripheral vision). For each line of the cone traced 
outwards from his eyes, consider the first, or nearest, opaque object in 
that line. Next consider the set of all such nearest objects. Finally, 
consider the subset of these objects which are illuminated at the time in 
question. ! shall say that each member of this subset, or all members 
collectively, bear the environmental relation 'R '  to the perceiver (or to 
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his visual percept). In other words, roughly speaking, an object O bears R 
to S at t .if and only if (a) O is illuminated at t (or is a source of 
illumination), (b) S has a visual percept at t, (c) S's eyes are open at t, and 
(d) O is a first opaque object in a line within the conical region defined 
above. (Notice that an 'environmental '  relation such as R does not merely 
pertain to the organism's environment but also, for example, to the 
orientation of certain of the organism's bodily organs.) 
Now in the vast majority of cases in which a visually generated belief is 
uniquely satisfied by some object, the object is in relation R to the subject 
of the visual percept. For this reason, relation R is selected as a con- 
stituent of the visual modality, z As a first approximation, a person is said 
to see an object (at t) if and only if the object bears relation R to him (at t). 
(This is by no means my final account. It will be modified and sup- 
plemented in several respects). In other words, O is a visual object for S 
at t if and only if O bears R to S at t. 
Notice that although we have selected R because of its connection with 
(unique) belief-satisfaction, there is nothing in the conception of R that is 
related to belief-satisfaction, unique or otherwise. Thus, it is logically 
possible for someone to see an object which does not satisfy (uniquely or 
non-uniquely) any visually-generated belief of his. 
Consider another relation, R*.  An object bears R* to S at t if and only 
if it is outside the conical region that we used to define R. (We could 
define R* simply as the complement of R relative to S. This would 
include objects behind a nearest opaque object but within the conical 
region. The proposed definition, however, makes examples a bit more 
intuitive.) Now objects in R* are not said to be seen, at least not in 
primary cases of seeing. (I shall come to secondary cases momentarily.) 
These objects are not seen even if they uniquely satisfy some visually- 
generated belief. The reason for this, once again, is that R is a much more 
fecund source of true visually-generated belief than R*, so we select R, 
but not R*, as constitutive of the visual modality. 
If you need to be persuaded that R is a much richer source of true 
visually-generated belief than R*, consider the following. Suppose you 
want to get as much and as detailed information (true belief) as possible, 
by visual means, about some object. Wouldn' t  you try to get it into 
relation R to you, rather than R*? If the object is not a source of 
illumination, there is virtually nothing you could learn about it by visual 
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means, if it is in R* to you. But there are innumerable things you could 
reliably learn about it if it were in R to you (at least if it were close enough 
and there were enough illumination). Even if the object were a lamp, 
however, or other source of illumination, R would be a much more 
fecund source of information than R*. You can detect much more about 
even a lamp's shape, size, texture, and relative position by looking at it 
than by looking at things it illuminates. That it is one lamp rather than 
two, or that it is a lamp at all (rather than a naked bulb), is much more 
reliably ascertainable in R than in R*. 
We cannot, of course, rest content with the suggestion that R is the 
exclusive constituent of the visual modality concept. An object 's being in 
R to S at t is not necessary for S's seeing it at t. You can see objects in 
mirrors or on television, when they are not in R to you. R is also 
insufficient for vision, for reasons that will emerge in different parts of the 
paper. To begin to remedy the situation, let us consider another relation, 
a counterfactual dependence relation. (I use 'counterfactual dependence '  
in the sense of Lewis, 1973.) 
Associated with relation R is a certain counterfactual dependence,  a 
dependence of one's visual percept on the aggregate of objects in R. 
Suppose a certain set of objects, with specific properties, bear R to S at t. 
If hypothetical changes were made in these objects at t, there would be 
certain sorts of changes in S's visual percept. If one of the objects were 
much larger than it actually is, or had an entirely different shape, there 
would be corresponding differences in S's visual percept - at least if S 
were attending to the relevant portions of his visual field. If the objects in 
R were different objects than they actually a r e -  e.g., cars and skyscrapers 
rather than cows and silos - there would again be corresponding differ- 
ences in the visual percept. Needless to say, not all differences in the 
objects, or their properties, would be reflected in differences of percept. 
But a wide range of differences would be so reflected. 
Give the label 'D '  to the counterfactual dependence relation 
associated with R. Now although D is associated with R, it is not 
associated with R only. There are other circumstances in which the same 
counterfactual relation - or a very similar one - holds between an object 
and a perceiver (or percept), specifically, cases in which a mirror is 
appropriately situated vis-a-vis the object and the perceiver, or cases in 
which the object is shown on television. Admittedly, the counterfactual 
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dependences in reflections and television are not exactly the one 
associated with R. They include left-right reversals, loss of vividness, or 
loss of the third dimension. Nonetheless, they may be regarded as 
degenerate cases of relation D. Now relation D, so construed, is an 
integral part of our concept of vision. In those cases where D obtains but 
R does not, we still say that the object in D is seen by the perceiver. Thus, 
relation D is one constituent of the visual modality concept. When an 
object bears both R and D to S, we have a primary case of seeing. When 
an object bears D but not R to S, we have a secondary case of seeing. 
I shall not try to describe the counterfactual dependence that comprises 
relation D. Not only is D too complex to describe, but all of us (who are 
sighted) are sufficiently acquainted with it to make such description 
unnecessary. Moreover, the only way of describing differences in per- 
cepts is in terms of the stimulus conditions on which they depend. So any 
such description is likely to be unhelpful. To pick out dependence D, 
however, it helps to contrast it with another counterfactual dependence 
involving visual percepts. This is dependence D*, the counterfactual 
dependence of a visual percept on objects in relation R* to the perceiver 
(objects not reflected in mirrors, etc.) 
To illustrate the difference between D and D*, consider a lamp of a 
certain size, shape, and color. Imagine it being directly in front of you, and 
your having the appropriate visual percept. Then imagine the differences 
in the percept you would have if, counterfactually, the lamp were much 
larger, or very different in shape, or very different in color, or much 
farther away. Now change the case. Imagine the lamp being behind you. 
Then make the same hypothetical changes in its size, shape, color, and 
distance. Although some of the latter hypothetical changes would result 
in differences in your visual percept, the kinds of differences would be 
entirely different from the differences associated with the first set of 
hypothetical changes. This difference in kinds of differences illustrates 
the difference between D and D*. 
It must be admitted that the idea of a single counterfactual dependence 
D is a simplification. What a percept is like at a given moment depends on 
more than current environmental stimuli, or receptor stimulation. It 
depends as well on memories, categories, and expectations that filter 
incoming stimulation: these contribute to the 'construction' of the per- 
cept from the initial stimulation. People with different categories, 
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schemata, or expectations (as well as different degrees of sensitivity in 
receptive organs) will undergo different changes in percepts for the same 
hypothetical changes in stimulus conditions. I think, however, that there 
is sumcient homogeneity among perceivers that, in the interest of 
simplicity, we may speak of a 'single' relation D. The identity of D, after 
all, is to be defined in terms of its contrast with other visual dependences, 
such as D*. Such a contrast exists for all visual perceivers; indeed, 
roughly the same contrast. 
I l l  
As developed thus far, my theory says that our visual modality concept 
has two constituents: environmental relation R and counterfactual rela- 
tion D. But neither R nor D, it will be noted, is an explicitly causal 
relation (though one view of causation, to be discussed later, says that the 
counterfactual dependence guarantees a causal relationship). In what 
sense, then, is my theory a version of the causal theory? 
I am not certain that the causal theory of perception is correct if it 
embodies the claim that concepts of perception have always included a 
causal component. It seems clear, though, that our current concept of 
perception includes such a component. Arguably, it has always been the 
case that the ascription of perceptual achievement requires some causal 
connection between object and percept, without specification of the 
details of the causal connection. But it is also true that, over time, some 
degree of causal detail has been built into each of the various perceptual 
modality concepts. 
A rational reconstruction of the development of a modality concept 
might go as follows. Initially, a modality concept is tied to an environmen- 
tal relation and a counterfactual relation. It is natural, however, to inquire 
into the causal mechanisms that underlie the counterfactual dependence. 
Part of the mechanism is normally part of the environmental relation 
itself, i.e., that part that involves bodily organs. Other causally relevant 
features are suggested by other conditions involved in the environmental 
and/or counterfactual relations, e.g., the fact that visual percepts are 
affected by conditions of illumination, auditory percepts by the condition 
of the air, etc. Gradually, hypotheses are accepted concerning the details 
of the causal mechanism, and some of these hypotheses become part of 
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the everyday conception of the modality. It becomes part of the concept 
of vision, for example, that it involves the transmission of light from 
objects to the perceiver's eyes. 
We have already seen how a counterfactual relation can supersede an 
environmental relation, how, for example, D comes to be a more decisive 
constituent of vision than R. Similarly, once the notion of a certain 
physical medium, or other causal mechanism, becomes imbedded in a 
modality concept, it can sometimes override a counterfactual relation in 
importance. Whether  we use a specific modality term to describe the 
accomplishments of a non-human organism depends more on the causal- 
mechanism factor than the counterfactual dependence. (In part this is 
because our access to the percepts of other organisms, and hence their 
perceptual dependences, is very limited.) Why do we say, for example, 
that frogs see? The visual processing equipment of frogs, as Lettvin, 
Maturana, McCulloch, and Pitts (1959) have shown, is quite different 
from ours: it is much more specialized. The counterfactual dependence 
associated with their 'vision' must therefore be significantly different 
from D, the dependence I have claimed to be (partly) constitutive of 
vision. Still, we have little hesitation in saying that frogs see (even once we 
learn of the relevant physiological facts). Apparently, the counterfactual 
relation is less important than the causal-mechanism relation. Since the 
frog has organs of photoreception, whose construction is fairly similar to 
ours, and since he makes some of the same discriminations we make with 
our visual apparatus, we say that he too 'sees'. 
Should we conclude that the counterfactual dependence relation drops 
out of our concept of vision once we have enough information about 
causal mechanisms? I don' t  think so. Consider the following case. You 
begin to have visual experiences that co-vary in a D-like way with objects 
in a room three thousand miles away. When chairs and tables are in the 
room, you have visual experiences of an appropriate sort. When people 
are in the room, you have corresponding visual experiences. Etc. Inves- 
tigation shows that this co-variation is due to some physical medium other 
than light-transmission, and stimulation of organs other than your eyes. 
Despite this difference in causal mechanisms, wouldn't  we be inclined to 
say that you see the objects in the room? We might prefer calling it 
'clairvoyance'; but, etymologically, clairvoyance is clear vision. That we 
are still inclined to speak of vision, or something like vision, shows that 
P E R C E P T U A L  O B J E C T S  267 
the counterfactual component sometimes dominates the causal- 
mechanism component. 
My conclusion, then, is this. Each modality concept is constituted by a 
family of three relations. The first member of the family is an environ- 
mental relation (such as R), the second a counterfactual relation (such as 
D), and the third a causal-mechanism relation (e.g., light-transmission 
culminating in stimulation of photo-receptors). Paradigm, or primary, 
cases of perception in a modality are cases where all three members of the 
family are exemplified. When some members of the family are not 
exemplified, as in reflections or infra-human perception, a decision of 
whether to attribute perception in the modality in question sometimes 
emphasizes certain family members and sometimes others. 
How does my theory apply to the two-pillar example? Which pillar (if 
any) does Jones see, according to the theory? Well, Jones is not in relation 
R to pillar P (since P is not a first opaque object in his line of vision). Nor 
does Jones' visual percept depend counterfactually in manner D on pillar 
P. It is true (given our hypothesis about the contraption connecting P with 
P*) that if P weren't present at all, things would look different to Jones, 
since pillar P* wouldn't be where it is. But a change in color of P (we may 
suppose) would not have any effect on P*, and hence no effect on Jones' 
visual percept. And similarly (we may suppose) for differences in shape 
and texture of pillar P's surface. Finally, there is no process of light- 
transmission from P to Jones' eyes. For these reasons, Jones does not see 
P. 'What about P*? P* is not in R to Jones, but this alone does not 
preclude his seeing it. P* does bear the other relations to Jones, or to his 
percept. His visual percept depends counterfactually on P* in manner D 
(or :roughly D); and light-is transmitted from P* to Jones' eyes. So on our 
theory, Jones sees P* but not P. 
Let me give a rough summary of the theory as presented thus far. (The 
theory will not be complete until an important addition is made in Section 
VII+) The theory is two-tiered. The first tier contains the conditions in 
which object O is perceived by organism S. O is perceived by S (at t) if 
and only if there is a perceptual modality concept M composed of an 
environmental, a counterfactual, and a causal-mechanism relation such 
that O bears enough of (the most important of) these relations to a 
percept that S has (at t). The theory's second tier explains why certain 
environmental, counterfactual, and causal-mechanism relations, and not 
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others, are selected as constitutive of a modality concept. The relations 
selected as constitutive of a modality are those that most commonly 
obtain (or are believed to obtain) between objects and percepts when 
those objects uniquely satisfy beliefs which the percepts generate (or 
constitute). 
I V  
Let us test my theory of perceptual objects on other perceptual mod- 
alities, and on one outstanding problem concerning vision. First, consider 
the tactual, or haptic, modality. When you grasp a rod and touch various 
objects with it, e.g., a stone, you are said to 'feel' these objects. Why do we 
say that you feel these objects, as well as the rod itself? One point, of 
course, is crucial: you characteristically acquire true beliefs about the 
distal object, just as you acquire true beliefs about objects actually 
touched with the hand. Indeed, once the rod becomes familiar to you, you 
can acquire as much  true belief in this fashion as by unmediated contact 
with an object. What fundamentally underlies our use of the term 'feel', 
therefore, is true belief acquisition. Beyond this point, however, there are 
two ways of dealing with the case. 
First, one might say that in the rod-mediated case, the stone stands in 
the same  (or similar) environmental, counterfactual, and causal relations 
to you as in the unmediated case. This will mean, of course, that these 
relations have to be construed sufficiently broadly. The environmental 
relation, for example, must not require that the perceptual object be in 
contact  with some bodily part, but only in contact with some sequence of 
objects the final member of which is in contact with some bodily part. 3 
An alternative approach is to employ a principle that I mentioned in 
the original sketch of my theory. This is the principle that if classes of 
objects in two different (families of) relations to a given kind of percept 
satisfy percept-generated beliefs in roughly equal amounts, then both 
(families of) relations become constituents of the modality. Objects in 
either family of relations to a percept are said to be M-perceived. Now we 
might say that a stone in a rod-mediated case is not in the same family of 
relations to the perceiver as in an unmediated case. Yet both families of 
relations are 'approved' perceptual relations; both are constituents of the 
tactual modality. 
P E R C E P T U A L  O B J E C T S  269 
This principle seems to be required to handle audition and olfaction. In 
both of these modalities, a person is said to perceive objects that are 
(apparently) in different families of relations to the perceiver. A person is 
said to hear a bell, and also the sound of the bell. He is said to smell a 
skunk, and also the odor of the skunk. It seems plausible to say that the 
bell and its sound, and the skunk and its odor, are respectively in different 
families of relation to the percept. Each family, however, is a constituent 
of the auditory and olfactory modalities, respectively, because objects in 
each family satisfy percept-generated beliefs in roughly equal amounts as 
objects in the other family of relations to the same kind of percept. In 
other words, we form roughly equal amounts of true belief about sounds 
and sound-sources, and about odors and odor-sources. 4 (Here and 
elsewhere I use the preposition 'about '  for convenience. It can be 
replaced by our official terminology where necessary.) 
Let  us return to a remaining problem in the visual modality, the 
problem of proximal arrays of light. Why aren' t  we said to see these 
arrays, e.g., arrays of light two inches from our eyes? A large part of the 
answer is, of course, clear. We seldom form percept-generated beliefs 
that are satisfied uniquely by these proximal arrays. We seldom have 
beliefs of the form: 'There is an array of light at such-and-such a distance 
from me with properties I, J, and K' .  The beliefs that spontaneously arise 
from, or are constituted by, visual percepts are beliefs concerning distal 
objects (normally physical bodies), not proximal ones (at least not 
proximal rays of light). 
Why, it may well be asked, do we standardly form beliefs concerning 
odors and sounds, but not concerning proximal arrays of light? Why do 
we, as perceivers, think of odors and sounds as mediating our access to 
their sources, but do not think of light as mediating our access to physical 
objects? (Of course we do so think of light in our scientific moments,  but 
this does not pervade our intuitive thinking very much.) The answer, I 
think, runs as follows. Odors can often be smelled after their sources have 
departed, and the same holds, to a lesser extent, for sounds. An odor  of a 
skunk remains after the animal has disappeared. The echo of my voice is 
heard after I have finished calling. These cases are evident to common 
observation, and it forces us to countenance mediating 'objects'  of 
audition and olfaction, objects other than physical bodies. We have no 
comparable experience of objects that mediate our visual access to 
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physical bodies. Admittedly,  the same phenomenon occurs when we 
receive the light from a distant star, which may since have exploded. But 
common experience gives us no awareness of this phenomenon.  So we do 
not intuitively conceive of our visual access to the star.as mediated by 
another object. 
Another  kind of problem about light, however, emerges at this junc- 
ture. Although proximal arrays of light are not said to be seen, we do 
sometimes see (distal) light, e.g., the aurora borealis. A problem for my 
theory is this. It would seem that a proximal array of light is in the same 
family of relations - environmental,  counterfactual, and causal - as a 
distal array, such as the aurora borealis; it is only closer. According to my 
theory, therefore, we should either be said to see both or be said to see 
neither. Why, then, are we said to see the aurora borealis, but not the 
proximal array? 
To answer this question, I need a more precise rendering of my theory. 
In trying to explain the sorts of perceptual attributions we make, what is 
strictly relevant is not what environmental,  counterfactual, and causal 
relations actually obtain, but what relations we standardly believe to 
obtain. Whatever the scientific facts concerning proximal and distal 
arrays of light, we do not ordinarily conceive of, say, the aurora borealis 
as being in the same set of relations to us as arrays of light two inches from 
our eyes. We think of the aurora borealis as being constituted by colored 
light in certain locations, and of our visual percepts as depending, in a 
D-like way, on these colors. We do not so think of the light two inches 
from our eyes (in general, we do not think of it at all). It is certainly 
arguable that our thought on this subject ought to be reformed, and our 
language of perception along with it. But the primary task here is to 
understand our intuitive conceptual scheme, not to reform it. 
Let  me examine a few more cases to confirm my general theory. First, 
recall our bat example. Why do we think of the bat as perceiving objects 
in his path, but not himself? Given the bat's flight behavior, it is natural to 
attribute to him beliefs that are satisfied by obstacles in his path, such 
beliefs as 'There is a dense object occupying such-and-such a region', 
'There is an insect at such-and-such a spot', etc. Since these beliefs are 
elicited b y  the sonar signals that are caused, in part, by these belief- 
satisfying objects, we take the family of relations between this class of 
objects and the bat to be constitutive of his echolocation modality. Since 
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the bat does not bear those relations to himself, we do not think of him as 
perceiving himself. 
It might be pointed out that we could construe the bat as forming 
beliefs about his own location or change in location relative to the 
environment.  These would be beliefs he satisfies. But it doesn't  matter 
what beliefs we could attribute to him; what matters is only the beliefs we 
do (generally) attribute to him. I contend that the kind of objects we 
select as perceptual objects is determined (ultimately) by the beliefs we 
actually ascribe to perceivers. The bat example sustains this contention as 
long as the beliefs we actually attribute to the bat are primarily beliefs of 
the sort satisfied by external objects, not by himself. This seems to be 
correct. The beliefs we attribute to the bat are ones in which objects are 
located atsome distance from a (tacit) point of origin, viz., himself. These 
beliefs are satisfied (if at all) by objects other than himself. 
Another  example that confirms our theory involves rheumatic aches. 
Rheumatic aches are sometimes caused by drops in atmospheric pres- 
sure, drops that characteristically precede rain. A person who first 
experiences such aches would not be said to 'perceive' anything, at least 
no ,external state of the world. But if he gradually associates the aches 
with the onset of rain, we shall come to think of him as perceiving or 
sen:ring the onset of rain. He may not know enough to have beliefs about 
changes in atmospheric pressure. But he has beliefs like: 'Something is 
happening that will lead to rain'. The event that satisfies this belief, and 
also causes his ache, is the drop in atmospheric pressure. Hence, we say 
that he perceives such drops. We will say that he perceives a fall in 
atmospheric pressure even if his belief, on a particular occasion, happens 
to be false (because it doesn' t  rain). The atmospheric pressure is in the 
right (perceptual) relation to his ache, even though, on this occasion, it 
doesn' t  satisfy the ache-generated belief. 
V 
I have made a few obiter dicta about why certain beliefs are or are not 
formed. These remarks are not strictly part of the theory of perceptual 
objects. The theory is entitled to take it for granted that certain classes of 
belief are or are not formed; it need not explain these facts. Still, it is 
empirically interesting to consider why organisms form beliefs that are 
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satisfied by certain classes of objects and do not form beliefs, or form 
fewer beliefs, that are satisfied by other classes of objects. Why, for 
example, do visual percepts generate more beliefs that are satisfied by R - 
and-D-related objects than beliefs that are satisfied by R*-and-D*- 
related objects? And why don't  we form any beliefs (at least no spontane- 
ous or 'non-inferential' beliefs) that are satisfied by proximal arrays of 
light? 
Let us concentrate on people's superior ability to form beliefs that are 
satisfied by R-and-D-related objects, as opposed to beliefs that are 
satisfied by R*-and-D*-related objects. Part of the explanation is purely 
physical, as opposed to physiological. It concerns the relations between 
the classes of objects in question and the energy that impinges on the 
receptors. A necessary condition for systematic formation of true percep- 
tual belief - not merely occasional lucky guesses - is that differences 
among objects in the environment be mapped into differences of retinal 
excitation. Suppose there are a number of alternative possible states of an 
environment, each with equal prior probabilities. A person cannot reli- 
ably make a doxastic choice among these alternatives on the basis of 
background beliefs. He needs input from the environmental state that 
actually obtains, input that distinguishes this state from the other possible 
alternatives. In short, this state must produce distinctive receptor stimu- 
lation. If, however, the person's position relative to the environmental 
objects is such that the same receptor stimulation would result from any 
of the alternative states of the environment, there is no reliable way 
for him to form a true belief concerning which of these states actually 
obtains. 
Now this is roughly a person's position vis-a-vis objects that bear the 
R;~-and -D* relation to him. For any given retinal stimulation, large 
numbers of alternative sets of R*-and-D*-related objects are compatible 
with this stimulation. Objects that don't  emit light, and have no distinc- 
tive light-reflectant properties, make equivalent contributions to retinal 
stimulation. The retinal pattern would be the same, or essentially the 
same, whether the objects are chairs or tables, elephants or wildebeest. 
Thus, S cannot reliably form a belief, as a result of retinal stimulation, 
that a table or a wildebeest is in some R*-position relative to him. Even 
sources of illumination present problems. The ambient array of light 
impinging on S's retinae may be the same whether the R* region contains 
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two lamps or three lamps with the same total luminance. S has no reliable 
basis for belief about the number of lamps in his (R*) vicinity. 
In short, and to be more general, the ability of an organism to form 
beliefs that are (frequently or systematically) satisfied by objects in a 
certain relation to him depends on the mapping from classes of objects in 
this relation to receptor stimulation. The 'richer' this mapping - that is, 
the smaller the number of different possible states that are mapped into 
one pattern of stimulation - the greater the potential for true belief 
formation. 5 
Differences at the receptor level, however, do not ensure differences at 
the level of the percept. It is only at this higher level that beliefs are 
generated (or constituted). No actual perceptual processing system can 
retain, or make use of, all differences at the receptor level. As Cornsweet 
stresses, perceptual processing always involves the loss of information. 
(Cf. Cornsweet, 1970, p. 379.) 
Visual processing is a good case in point. The phenomena of brightness 
contrast and brightness constancy imply the loss of information about 
absolute light intensity. Take brightness contrast, for example. Due in 
part to lateral inhibition, experienced brightness does not depend so 
much on the absolute light intensities at regions of the retinae, but on 
differences or ratios of intensity between one retinal region and adjacent 
retinal regions. The apparent brightness of an R-related point in space 
does not depend so much on the amount of light it transmits, but on the 
amount it transmits in comparison with adjacent points in space. Since 
differences in reflectance typically occur at the edges or borders of 
physical objects, there is a consequent 'enhancement '  at the level of the 
percept of the edges or borders of R-related objects. This is helpful for 
detecting the shapes and shape-related properties of R-related objects, 
because the contours will tend to stand out. But the loss of information 
about absolute light intensity (at the level of the percept) is ill-suited for 
detecting properties of R*-related objects. Information about absolute 
light intensity is one kind of information that could help generate true 
belief about light sources in R*. The relevant physiological mechanisms 
of vision are ill-suited for this end. 6 
A physiological mechanism like lateral inhibition is adaptive, in the 
sense that beliefs about, or discriminations among, physical objects are 
biologically or ecologically more significant for the organism than beliefs 
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about, or discriminations among, absolute states of illumination. It is 
biologically useful to sacrifice information about absolute levels of illumi- 
nation to increase the information - i.e., the registering of the information 
- about physical objects. That visual systems are primarily evolved for 
registering information about physical objects, rather than about light per 
se, is indicated by the presence of another kind of photo-receptive 
mechanism that coexists with eyes in reptiles, fish cephalopods, and 
amphibians. (Cf. Bower, 1974.) These so-called 'third eyes' function to 
respond to light, and nothing else; real eyes do not function this way at all. 
These remarks obviously apply to the question of why we don't  form 
beliefs about proximal arrays of light. The interpretation of retinal 
stimulation in terms of distal physical bodies rather than proximal light 
clearly has a biological function. To survive, the organism can profit from 
an accurate representation of the presence or absence of predators and 
prey; it doesn't need a representation of the light two inches from its eyes. 
V I  
Given the importance of beliefs and percepts to my theory, some remarks 
about their relationship are in order. I have generally spoken of percepts 
as 'generating' beliefs, and this may suggest a causal relationship. It 
would be inaccurate, however, to think of percepts as only causing 
beliefs; some percepts themselves have belief-content. This content, 
moreover, is what plays the really critical role in our theory. I have 
claimed that vision, for example, does not generate beliefs that are 
satisfied by proximal arrays of light. But that is not strictly true: physicists 
and psychologists of perception can and do form beliefs - fairly detailed 
beliefs - that are satisfied by such arrays of light. The point is that these 
are only 'inferential' beliefs. They are not part of the visual percepts in the 
sense that it 'looks as if' there are arrays of light two inches before the 
eyes. (I do not preclude the possibility that beliefs of that sort could arise. 
If this happened, it would be natural to begin speaking of these persons as 
seeing the proximal arrays of light.) It is important to our theory, 
therefore, that the beliefs in question are 'embedded' in percepts, not 
merely caused by them. If beliefs can be embedded in percepts, however, 
how shall we conceptualize percepts? Are percepts simply sets of beliefs, 
as some philosophers maintain? Or do they have some other status? 
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A view of percepts as beliefs or inclinations to believe has been 
defended by Armstrong (1961) and Pitcher (1971), and goes back to the 
Idealists (cf. Hirst, 1959, p. 222). I think there is much to be said for this 
view, although for reasons to be explained I hesitate to accept it outright. 
Two initial clarifications should be made, however, to give the view even 
initial plausibility. 
An inevitable source of dissatisfaction with the Armstrong-Pitcher line 
is its apparent attempt to eliminate the sensuous or qualitative aspect of 
percepts. Of course, they would say that this qualitative aspect is not 
eliminated, but is captured by belief content, or at least belief-content 
coupled with the mode of acquisition. The differences between the 
percepts of the different modalities would be understood, on this view, in 
terms of the manner of acquisition, i.e., the sense-organs employed. But 
thiis will not do. Blind people often have an 'obstacle sense' involving 
percepts that are qualitatively like pressure against the face. These 
percepts, as it turns out, are acquired through the ears, just like auditory 
percepts. (Cf. J. J. Gibson, 1966.) To distinguish them from auditory 
percepts, one cannot appeal to mode of acquisition; one must appeal to 
qualitative difference. 
A more plausible version of a doxastic theory of percepts would 
distinguish the content of a mental event from the form or vehicle in which 
this content is encoded. Any content must have some manner of encod- 
ing. Perceptual or sensory qualities are simply distinctive manners of 
encoding. (Even 'intellectual' beliefs may have a quasi-perceptual 
embodiment: either quasi-auditory or quasi-motor, i.e., articulatory.) 
One can accept such qualities and still maintain that each particular 
qualitative event has cognitive, or doxastic, content. 
]Philosophers like Armstrong and Pitcher want to reduce sensory 
qualities to beliefs because of the ontological and epistemological 
problems they allegedly pose. But neither the ontological nor the epis- 
temologica] motivation is well grounded. The ontological status of sen- 
sory qualities may indeed be problematic, but no more problematic than 
the.. status of beliefs. There is little to be gained by reducing such qualities 
to beliefs. Concerning the epistemological problem, I believe one can be a 
direct realist without denying the qualitative distinctiveness of percepts: 
as long as one doesn't confuse percepts - i.e., perceptual states of the 
organism - with sense-data. 
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Second, it should be admitted that percepts are not propositional in 
form. Their content may be translated, with greater or less accuracy, into, 
say, existential propositions, but they do not really have a quantificational 
structure. To say they are 'iconic' modes of representation may be 
correct, but, pending some acceptable rendering of 'iconic', isn't very 
illuminating. Cognitive psychology has witnessed some interesting argu- 
ments in support of non-verbal modes of information-processing (cf. 
Shepard and Metzler, 1971, and Paivio, 1971.) But the conceptual issues 
here remain to be settled (cf. Pylyshyn, 1973). 
If percepts are not propositional, how can they be belief-like at all? The 
content of beliefs must be classifiable as true or false, correct or incorrect. 
But only propositional content can be so classified. This problem goes 
beyond our purview, but here is one possible answer. Suppose a percept 
involves, among other things, a set of motor plans or dispositions, 
dispositions, say, for touching or handling the perceptual object. (Such a 
view is advocated by 'motor copy' theorists of perception, and is hinted at 
by Piaget. For a survey, see E. J. Gibson, 1969.) Such plans or disposi- 
tions can have a tendency either for 'success' or 'failure': a plan for 
touching the object might be well-designed or ill-designed for touching it. 
The correctness or incorrectness of a percept, then, could consist in its 
propensity to produce successful or unsuccessful motor activity. 
Resolution of these two issues is preliminary to a defense of a doxastic 
view of percepts. What positive considerations favor such a view? Here 
are a few. First, even if the motor account of percepts is not right in 
general, it is clear that many, if not all, percepts have a behavior-guiding 
function. (Potential) behavior-guidingness, moreover, is an essential 
characteristic of belief in general. Consider kinesthetic sensations, which 
we may regard as a species of percept. When playing the piano, the feeling 
of the fingers as being certain distances apart guides one in changing their 
relative position for the next chord. Successful finger deployment does 
not require a non-sensory thought in addition to the kinesthetic feeling; 
the kinesthetic feeling embodies the information about the present 
position of the fingers. Similarly, the vestibular feeling of the body as 
being oriented thus-and-so relative to gravity is a belief concerning one's 
orientation; at least it guides one's bodily movements in the way that 
beliefs in general guide behavior. 
Second, many percepts have 'abstract' content. I may see an object not 
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merely as having a certain size and shape, but as a hammer, a table, or a 
tree. Such abstract categories may be more prominent in the percept than 
spatial or qualitative features. 
Third, even spatial or qualitative representations may be regarded as 
essentia]ly cognitive. What is fundamental to cognition is classification; 
and spatial or qualitative representations are simply particular kinds of 
classification. That the basic function of perception is classificatory may 
be inferred from physiological and psychological investigation, if not 
from introspection. (A) Perceptual systems, according to current theory, 
are composed of various feature analyzers, designed to detect specific 
properties of external stimuli. (The work of Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, is 
pioneering in this domain.) (B) Perceptual processes operate so as to 
organize sensory input into meaningful categories. (See, for example, 
Lindsay and Norman, 1972.) (C) There is evidence of pre-established, 
discrete categories into which continuous sensory data are grouped. 
Specifically, both hue perception and speech perception are charac- 
terized by a division of the continuous physical input into discontinuous 
categories. (Cf. Bornstein etal., 1976, Eimas etal., 1971.) A single (e.g., 
visual) percept involves so many classifications that it is impossible to map 
them all into some accessible set of verbal classifications. But that should 
not be allowed to obscure the fundamental--classificatory nature of 
perception. 
Fourth, percepts are influenced by higher forms of cognition, and 
sometimes behave in ways akin to higher processes. For example, the 
perceived segmentation of a discourse depends on one's knowledge of the 
language and one's expectations about what can or will be said. (Cf. Halle 
and Stevens, 1962.) Next consider perceptual adaptation. After wearing 
inverting spectacles, subjects with appropriate learning opportunities 
undergo reinversion of images. (Cf. Kohler, 1964.) The general cognitive 
system of the organism seems bent on securing a coherent or unified 
representation, by coordinating its visual with its tactual representations. 
This is similar to the readjustment of (non-perceptual) beliefs in the 
attempt to preserve consistency. 
Against these considerations, the following brief rebuttals might be 
made. 
Many of the foregoing arguments could at best show that some per- 
cepts have cognitive components, not that all do, or that percepts 
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necessarily have belief-content. Moreover, it is highly problematic 
whether all percepts have such content, or whether every aspect of every 
percept has such content. There is the traditional problem of the percep- 
tual experience of the newborn, and of the congenitally blind person after 
cataract surgery. Although sensory input may provide the potential for 
classification and organization, it is not clear that perceptual experience 
at these stages yet manifests this potential. Certainly behavioral control 
does not set in immediately. And many theorists would argue that the 
potential for classification and discrimination does not get actualized until 
the organism learns to attend to relevant segments of its sensory data. (Cf. 
E. J. Gibson, 1969.) Even in the mature individual, not all information 
that is present at lower levels is grasped in focal consciousness. Current 
theory views perceptual processing as involving various stages through 
which 'information' is filtered or channeled. Certain material is fully 
analyzed, but other, unattended material is only briefly retained and not 
fully digested. (Cf. Sperling, 1960 and Treisman, 1964. For reviews, see 
Neisser, 1967 and Norman, 1969.) This attenuated material, I would 
claim, manifests itself in the percept as a sort of blur, and a subsequent 
feeling that a lot was 'there' that wasn't fully noticed. Having not noticed, 
or retained, this material, it cannot be regarded as a belief, or as having 
belief-content. This shows that some characteristics of percepts do not 
have belief-content. Perhaps 'undeveloped' perceISts are entirely like 
this, and therefore have no belief-content at all. 
Another kind of criticism of the doxastic theory is that some percepts 
are not full-fledged beliefs, because what is suggested or intimated by the 
percept is rejected or ignored at a higher (cognitive) level. When I see a 
stick half immersed in water, the stick looks bent even if I don't believe it 
is bent. This point, however, can be conceded by the doxastic theorist. He 
can reply that percepts are always kinds of cognitive input into a larger 
cognitive system. This input may sometimes be suppressed, ignored, or 
rejected, but is still a form of cognitive input. Moreover, in ordinary cases 
it is not merely 'input'. Unless it is explicitly suppressed or rejected by the 
'central clearing-house', it functions as a belief. 
It is not crucial to our theory to settle this issue definitively. It is 
congenial to an information-acquisition theory of perceptual objects to 
have a doxastic view of percepts. But my theory of perceptual objects 
does not require the strongest form of a doxastic view of percepts. As long 
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as percepts frequently contain cognitive content - as long as enough 
aspects of percents are beliefs or belief-like entities - this should 
safeguard the effort to identify perceptual objects (indirectly) in terms of 
belief-satisfaction. 
It might be suggested that a strong form of the doxastic view of percepts 
would be uncongenial to my theory, because it would favor the direct 
information-acquisition theory of perceptual objects which 1 rejected. 
This suggestion is based on the recognition that the more belief-content is 
attributed to a percept, the harder it is to find or conceive of cases in which 
a percept fails to have any belief-content that the perceptual object 
satisfies. 
The most this could show, however, is that belief-satisfaction is a 
necessary condition of being a perceptual object. (Nor does even this 
much follow. Though percepts may be replete with belief-content, there 
may be cases in which none of the belief-content is true of the perceptual 
object.) It does not bear on the question of sufficient conditions for 
perceptual objecthood. As we saw earlier, a direct information- 
acquisition theory of perception founders on this problem. 
V I I  
My theory of perceptual objects is not yet complete. Consider a small 
rock on a distant mountain I am viewing. This rock bears relation R, 
relation D, and the appropriate light-transmission relation to me. But I 
don't  see it. It is true that the rock is an (R-related) element of a larger 
entity, the mountain, which I see. Still, I don't  see the rock. The general 
point can be made as follows. Let O* be the aggregate of stimuli that 
jointly bear the appropriate relation, or family of relations, to S's 
Q-percept at t, and let O be a sub-unit of O* that also bears this relation 
to S. Although our theory correctly implies that O* is M-perceived by S, 
it incorrectly implies that O is also perceived by S. To correct this 
implication, we need to say something more about sub-units. 
The right move seems to be the one Dretske makes: a sub-unit is 
perceived only if it is differentiated by S from its immediate environment 
(Dretske, 1969). If a piece of beige paper is glued to a beige wall, a person 
sees the paper only if he differentiates it from the (adjacent portions of) 
the', wall. A person eating a carrot-orange soup can be said to taste the 
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orange only if the orange flavor is differentiated by him from the other 
component  flavor. A person listening to an orchestral passage can be said 
to hear the violas only if he differentiates the sound of the violas from the 
sounds of the other instrumental sections. 
There are two problems with this approach. The first, which I shall not 
try to solve completely, is what 'differentiates' means. The best effort 
Dretske makes is to say (for the case of vision) that S differentiates O 
from its immediate environment just in case O 'looks different' to him 
than the objects in the immediate environment. What does 'looks differ- 
ent' mean? Does it mean that O appears to have some property that the 
other objects in the immediate environment do not appear to have? This 
requirement is not strong enough. There is a property which the piece of 
paper appears to have that the adjacent portions of the wall don't  appear 
to have, viz., occupying its particular location. Yet S does not see the 
piece of paper. 
The second problem is also suggested by an example of Dretske's. If we 
select a reasonably large portion of a perfectly homogeneous wall that 
you see, you would also be said to see that portion, though it isn't 
differentiated from adjacent portions. So the differentiation condition, 
even if properly explicated, is not universal. 
I would approach the two problems as follows. A potential perception- 
attributor divides the environment into natural units, that have certain 
discontinuities or inhomogeneities. A piece of paper is a distinct unit from 
a wall, but the several portions of a wall are not distinct units. 7 With 
respect to a natural unit O, S is not said to perceive O (where O is a 
sub-unit of the aggregate perceptual stimulus) unless something in S's 
percept represents its distinctness, that is, unless something in the percept 
is a clue to there being such a distinct natural unit present. (I say a 'clue' 
because it would be too much to require that S believe there is such a 
natural unit.) A representation of distinctness might be a representation 
of an edge or boundary, or of a distinctive flavor. Mere difference in 
positional representation, though, does not constitute such a representa- 
tion, because it isn't a clue to a distinct natural unit. 
The above condition only applies to the perception of natural units. A 
portion of a wall is said to be perceived even when it is not differentiated 
from its environment because it is not a distinct natural unit. 
With respect to natural units, perceptual verbs are, in Goodman's  
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terminology, non-dissective (Goodman, 1951). That is, where O is a 
proper  part of O* and a natural unit, the fact that O* is M-perceived by S 
(at t) does not entail that O is M-perceived by S (at t). 
The non-dissectiveness of perceptual verbs partly explains the oddity 
of saying that S sees a mass of molecules (when, for example, he sees a 
table). In interpreting 'S sees a mass of molecules' there is a temptation to 
read 'mass of molecules' distributively, so that the sentence implies, 'S 
sees at least one molecule'. But this sentence is false. Given the non- 
dissectiveness of 'see', S may see something made up of molecules 
without seeing any molecule. Since a molecule is a 'natural unit', he would 
have to differentiate one molecule from adjacent objects. But no one can 
do this with the naked eye. Of course, one can interpret 'mass of 
molecules' non-distributively. Such a reading is mandatory when the 
foregoing sentence is rewritten as: 'S sees something that is in fact a mass 
of molecules'. This sentence, however, is neither odd nor false. 
V I I I  
Let me close with a difficulty for the causal component  of my theory. 
Consider the following example (which I owe to Jaegwon Kim). You are 
looking at the night-time sky through a telescope, and detect a region of 
total blackness against a background of diffuse light. This portion of your 
phenomenal field, it turns out, is attributable to a black hole. Wouldn't  we 
say that you see the black hole? But there is no light-transmission from 
the black hole to your eyes; nor is any other energy transmitted from it to 
your eyes. We seem to have a counterexample to the causal theory of 
perception. 
Is it really a counterexample? The best approach is to distingtaish two 
senses of 'cause'. (Like other philosophers, I try not to multiply senses; 
but sometimes it is natural.) One sense of 'cause' is a counterfactual sense, 
the second a physical mechanism sense. The counterfactual sense of 
'cause' is roughly the sense captured by David Lewis' analysis (Lewis, 
1973), or a somewhat stronger analysis along those lines. In this sense, it 
is sufficient for C to cause E (where C and E are events) that E wouldn't  
have occurred if C hadn't  occurred. The counterfactual sense of 'cause' is 
satisfied in the black hole case. Your percept wouldn't  be the same (you 
wouldn't  have that percept) if the black hole weren' t  where it is. If the 
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causal theory of perception requires causation only in the counterfactual 
sense, the black hole is not a counterexample. It is a counterexample, 
though, if the theory involves the physical mechanism sense of 
'cause'. Such a sense would say that an event (or object) causes another 
event only if there is some transfer of energy or force from the first 
event to the second. This requirement is violated in the black hole 
case. 
Now the theory of the several modalities (which belongs to the theory 
of perception) seems to need the physical mechanism sense of 'cause'. 
Modalities are partly distinguished by kinds of causal mechanisms. If no 
physical mechanism is at work, how can we say there is vision, hearing, or 
what have you? We could dismiss this as a case where environmental and 
counterfactual components of the modality-concept take precedence 
over the causal-mechanism component. But ! think another solution is 
preferable. 
Even in the black hole case, the quality of your percept is partly 
attributable to light transmission. There is no light transmission from the 
black hole, but light transmission from other regions partly explains the 
salient blackness in the middle of your visual field. The salient blackness 
results from a difference or contrast in light-transmission: some light from 
adjacent regions and no light from the black hole. Since the black hole is 
one of the objects responsible for this contrast (in the counterfactual 
sense of 'responsible'), it satisfies all that should properly be required by 
way of a causal constraint on objects of vision. 
A virtue of this 'contrastive' approach to the causal requirement is that 
it accords with the way perceptual systems work in general: they respond 
to differences in light intensity or differences in pressure, rather than 
absolute levels of intensity or pressure. (Cf. Lindsay and Norman, 1972, 
p. 111, and Bower, 1974.) An example of this is the phenomenon of 
habituation. Sensory systems in general become habituated to recurrent 
patterns of stimulation, so that these patterns no longer reach the level of 
consciousness. Only changes or differences in stimulation are registered 
at the perceptual level. We stop hearing the ticking of a clock or the hum 
of an air-conditioner, but notice the cessation of such a pattern. 
Cornsweet (1970) tells an illustrative story. At 11:46 in the evening, an 
electrical failure disabled Big Ben's chimes so that they could not sound. 
At 12:00 sharp, the man who lived next door leapt out of bed and 
P E R C E P T U A L  O B J E C T S  283 
shouted: ~What was that?' It is tempting to say that there was something 
this man heard: the non-ringing of the chimes. Of course, this non-ringing 
did not cause the man's auditory percept via sound-wave transmission. 
But the non-ringing was causally responsible for his auditory percept 
because it (among other things) was causally responsible (in the counter- 
factual sense) for the difference between past sound-wave patterns on his 
ear-drums and the current sound-wave pattern (i.e., no impingement) on 
his ear-drums. 
The University of Michigan 
N O T E S  
* This paper was written while the author  was a John Simon Guggenhe im Fellow and a 
Fellow of the Center  for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am indebted to 
Holly S. Goldman for a number  of valuable criticisms and suggestions. I have also received 
helpful comments  from several Center  Fellows, including Keith S. Donnellan.  
1 Perhaps I should say, here and elsewhere, 'non-trivial true belief'. This would exclude 
beliefs such as ' O  is an object ' .  
z It is not clear how we pick out  exactly relation R, rather than some slightly more or slightly 
less inclusive relation. Clearly, considerations of simplicity and naturalness are involved; 
but I shall not speculate on the details of these considerations. 
3 Or, one might treat the rod-mediated case like mirror-vision. The s tandard envi ronmen-  
tal relation is not satisfied, but the counterfactual and causal relations are satisfied. 
4 It should not  be concluded, of course, that a / /ob jec ts  causally relevant to an auditory or 
olfactory percept are said to be heard or smelled. As in vision, some causes are not 
perceptual objects. An auditory percept is causally dependent  on the acoustic properties of 
the environment .  Whether  a sound is heard at all, and how loud or lush it sounds,  depends,  
for example,  on the curvature of the ceiling and on the absorbent  properties of the 
furnishings. (Designers of whisper chambers  and orchestra halls take such things into 
account.) But people are not said to hear the ceiling or the furniture. Again,  this is explicable 
in terms of true belief acquisition. We seldom form percept-generated beliefs about  the 
acoustic properties of the environment ,  such as the ceiling or the furniture. 
5 This discussion echoes themes I have stressed in Goldman (1976). In several respects the 
present  paper  is a companion piece to that one. 
6 In these passages the term ' information '  does not usually mean  ' true belief', but  has a 
connotat ion derived from information theory. See the introduction to Cornsweet  (1970). 
v Which units are 'natural '  units is a problem broached (in somewhat  different terms) by 
Roderick Firth, in Firth (1967). I shall not a t tempt  to resolve this problem. 
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